Abdullah al-Muhaysini is no longer concerned about U. S. punishment. The former jihadist preacher was removed from the SDN ( Special Designated Nationals ) list at the end of August 2026 by the U. S. Treasury. This list of individuals and organizations with foreign assets that are frozen and are unable to conduct business with Americans is included in this OFAC ( Foreign Asset Control Office ) list.
Abdullah as Muhaysini worked as a religious advisor to the Arab branch of Al Qaeda during the Syrian Civil War, among other things.
Al Muhaysini is credited with helping to build Al Nusra as a power structure in Syria and recruiting soldiers. Washington has since withdrawn the organization's designation as a criminal. Al Nusra, which later became Hayat Tahrir al Sham ( HTS), was also taken off the SDN list. His removal from the list is a result of the recent US coverage toward Syria.
It makes headlines twenty-five centuries after the attacks of September 11, despite the fact that Al Qaeda still exists and is not the same as it was when it was founded. While its local subsidiaries are still operating in powerful positions in parts of Africa and Asia, its core has weakened. Additionally, the core management and its regional branches are getting closer together.
Islamist Rüdiger Lohlker urges us to" we may reject the hegemonic view. " According to him, ideology companies have always had much more of a presence outside of Europe and the United States than it seems from the perspective of the West.
This is present in Africa to be seen. The powerful Jamaat Nusrat al Islam wal Muslimin ( JNIM, Islam and Muslim Support Group ), a group of al-Qaeda-linked organizations, has grown to become a significant force in the Sahel. Al Shabaab, which is closely linked to Al Qaeda, has a strong reputation in Somalia. Al Qaeda is still active in Yemen's Arabian Peninsula ( AQAP ). Afghanistan also serves as a shelter for the business.
Al Qaeda is, nevertheless, acting less and less under its own name. This trend, according to Professor Lars Berger of violence research at the Federal University of Applied Sciences in Germany, is largely attributable to the success of the fight against terrorism following 2001. The group was significantly weakened by the military's intervention in Afghanistan and the knowledge and police forces ' assistance.
The September 11 attacks were a significant proper loss for Al Qaeda, Berger told DW. Additionally, they failed in their efforts to stop the Muslim world from becoming more radical or stop the regional dictatorships, which the Islamist firm had hoped would happen. Osama bin Laden, the most well-known experience of Al Qaeda, was killed in May 2011, about ten years after the problems in New York and Washington.
Al Qaeda was reorganized. According to Berger," the militia sought areas where they could settle entirely, particularly in parts of Africa and Yemen. " The most beneficial conditions can be found in states with weak institutions, crowded security forces, and regional conflicts that are unresolved.
Over time, al-Qaeda's technique has also changed. Berger notices a" corporate turn": it has switched from directly attacking the alleged "distant enemy" to consolidating local institutions.
We are now seeing an attempt to take an progressive and alternative course of action: instead of performing magnificent acts of violence straight from the mountain, we are betting on smaller, more local-style actions.
This includes establishing local relationships, gaining political power within local governments, and enforcing territorial laws in the Sahel. This creation is described by The Critical Threats Project as a "localization" process.
Now, the business must decide whether to appoint a new generation of militants to replace it.
That is a possibility, according to Behnam Heidenreuter-Said to DW. The Hamburg Police Academy's violence analyst believes that Al Qaeda's reputation is steadily fading, especially in Europe, where violent jihadism has lost its allure. But, jihadist thoughts still exist; what Al Qaeda has lost is its original capacity to mobilise a sizable population of young people.
Al Qaeda's fundamental organization is poor, but its geographical affiliates are not. In specific, JNIM, Al Shabaab, and AQAP also have significant impact in fragile says.
Everyone agrees that there is little information about Al Qaeda, according to Heidi Reuter-Said, who adds an important point.
Al Qaeda hasn't vanished in twenty-five decades after the 11-S, but it is still a part of what it was in the past. It has generally lost its place on the international level and has come to learn to survive on the local level. It is improbable that al-Qaeda will be able to survive long enough in fragile states to transition from a criminal organization to a lasting political and military force.
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